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Abstract 
Does ownership status of agricultural land determine farmers’ soil use behaviour? Why (not)?  
We investigate this old question using multiple methods and data. We apply econometric analysis 
to plot-level data to determine whether planting decisions differ between rented and owned plots. 
In addition, we analyse interviews with Austrian farmers with the aim of explaining (a lack of) 
differences. We find a very small influence of tenancy on crop choice in the quantitative part of the 
study, and qualify these findings in the qualitative part. If at all, interviewed farmers treat rented and 
owned land differently primarily with respect to fertilization or liming, particularly if the rental is 
insecure or short-term. We find that renting is often perceived as long-term and secure in Austria, 
resulting in equal soil conservation behaviour on rented and owned plots. Personal relationships 
between renter and landowner as well as farmers’ attitudes additionally support soil conservation. 
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1 Introduction 
The question of how different land property rights affect farmers’ resource allocation decisions 
is a classic economic question. Scholars including Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Alfred 
Marshall have already debated the influence of land tenure arrangements on farmers’ 
investment in land (Johnson, 1950). While the debate has its origins in the efficiency effects 
of sharecropping arrangements compared to full ownership (‘Marshallian inefficiency’, see 
e.g., Quibria and Rashid, 1984 for a discussion), it has since expanded to cash rental 
arrangements and soil conservation. The general reasoning conceives of a trade-off between 
short-run economic payoffs and long-term investments, e.g., into soil fertility and soil erosion 
control. While farmland owners tend to have strong incentives to invest in soil conservation to 
protect the value of their land, renters, due to their shorter planning horizon, are assumed to 
focus on short-term profits and, in doing so, deplete the soil (Lee, 1980). 
Previous research on the relationship between tenure and investments in land quality is most 
abundant for countries of the Global South. Interest has largely focused on these countries as 
rental and ownership are both not necessarily secure in less developed countries and the 
institutional background is generally weaker than elsewhere. Moreover, land markets have 
been established only recently in some countries, e.g., China (Gao et al., 2012). While many 
studies show that security of rental (and ownership) tends to have positive effects on 
investments in most cases, there is also contradictory evidence. For example, Gebremedhin 
and Swinton (2003), Abdulai et al. (2011), and Lovo (2016) empirically show that more secure 
forms of tenure have a positive effect on soil conservation investments in different African 
countries, as do Muraoka et al. (2018), who additionally show that this is primarily true for 
productivity and long-term investments, but not for investments that pay off in the same year. 
Brasselle et al. (2002) find no effect of tenure security on investments. Comparing rental and 
ownership, Jacoby and Mansuri (2008) investigate the application of manure on plots with 
different property status in Pakistan, and find that both sharecropping and cash rental 
decrease this investment into soil fertility, but long-term contracts minimise this effect. 
Conversely, Shaban (1987) finds an effect on input and output intensities only for 
sharecropping and not for cash rental as compared to ownership in India. More general, a 
review of studies from middle- and low-income countries (Higgins et al., 2018) and a review 
of African studies only (Fenske, 2011) conclude that the effect of tenure security on 
investments in land quality is positive to ambiguous, but results depend on the indicators and 
methods used. Importantly, some authors show that causality may also be reversed in this 
context, such that investments into land increase farmers’ tenure security (e.g., Brasselle et 
al., 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2006; Moreda, 2018). 
This literature provides some insights that may also be relevant for other contexts. First, a 
negative effect of rental on investments appears to be more robust for sharecropping 
arrangements than for cash rental, although evidence is not fully conclusive and impacts may 
depend on supervision by landowners (Deininger et al., 2013; Jacoby and Mansuri, 2009; 
Shaban, 1987). Second, effects appear to be more pronounced where rental is insecure 
and/or short-term (e.g., Jacoby and Mansuri, 2008). Third, the studied variables vary widely, 
and different types of investments may by influenced differently by property status. Last, 
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empirical methods to estimate the effect of property status have been continuously developed 
in these studies, with econometric methods using household fixed effects (that essentially 
compare plots of farms that are owner cum tenants) now being widely applied as a robust 
approach. 
With this background in mind, one might expect that in countries of the Global North, the 
effects of property status on investments into land and conservation behavior in particular may 
be less pronounced, as security of tenure (and ownership) is usually guaranteed. Moreover, 
focusing on cash rental, which is the focus of our paper, may also reduce potential effects. 
However, the existing empirical studies, primarily from North America, produce inconclusive 
results. The earliest studies on the impact of land tenancy on soil conservation date back to 
the 1930s, when soil erosion became an important issue in the wake of the ‘Dust Bowl’ in the 
US. Schickele and Himmel (1938) were among the first to provide empirical evidence that land 
rental may indeed discourage soil conservation, but they also emphasize the importance of 
the relationship between landlord and renter (e.g., family relations) for land use decisions. 
Further findings for North America from the 1980s range from higher soil erosion rates and 
fewer conservation practices on rented fields than on owned fields (Ervin, 1982), to no 
difference in soil erosion between rented and owned land (Lee, 1980), to renters being actually 
more likely than owners to adopt minimum tillage, a soil conservation system (Lee and 
Stewart, 1983). Twenty years later, Soule et al. (2000) find renters to be less likely to adopt 
soil conservation practices than owners, Cole and Johnson (2002) find no effect of tenure on 
soil erosion (accounting the finding to community norms and farmers’ concerns about their 
reputation), and Fraser (2004) finds that owners plant more soil-conserving crops (such as 
perennials, grain and forage legumes) than renters. Most recently, Varble et al. (2016) find that 
while renters are less likely to rotate crops, they are more likely to use conservation tillage. 
In contrast to North America, very little empirical evidence exists for Europe. To the best of our 
knowledge, only three European studies explicitly address the topic: Myyrä et al. (2005) find 
that in Finland, plots farmed by their owner have higher levels of soil pH and soil phosphorus 
than rented plots, suggesting that farmers invest more into owned land. Sklenicka et al. (2015) 
investigate the link between tenancy and crop choice in the Czech Republic and conclude that 
renters are more likely to plant wide-row crops (prone to soil erosion) than owners, but 
differences are mitigated by the more common participation of renters in agri-environmental 
schemes (AES) to some extent. Walmsley and Sklenicka (2017) show that soil quality is higher 
for owned plots than for rented plots under conventional farming, but find no differences for 
organic farms. All three studies rely on relatively small samples. Additional research based on 
large samples therefore appears desirable. Moreover, there are at least two further reasons 
to contribute empirical evidence for Europe. 
First, the historical and institutional background of farming as well as agricultural land markets 
differ substantially from those in other parts of the world, such that results found elsewhere 
cannot easily be transferred. In (Western) Europe, institutions are strong and land markets, 
including the rental market, are often strongly regulated (Swinnen et al., 2016). This increases 
the security of rental (and ownership), at least for the agreed rental period. However, 
differences between rental and ownership with respect to the farmers’ time horizons and thus 
pay-back time for investments remain, depending on the length of rental. We thus expect the 
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situation to be different from countries with weak institutions, but as the examples from the 
Czech Republic and Finland show, it appears still plausible to find an effect of rental on soil 
conservation practices. 
Second, recent developments in agricultural land markets demand increased attention. In 
particular, agricultural land sales markets are extremely tight in most EU countries, with the 
share of land changing owner at less than 1% per year in several of the old EU member states 
(Ciaian et al., 2012a). At the same time, the average farm size in EU-27 (EU-15) countries has 
increased by almost 40 (30)% in total and 3.1 (2.4)% per year from 11.9 (23.4) hectares (ha) 
in 2005 to 16.2 (27.8) ha in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018). As a result, the rental market is gaining 
importance. For example, rental shares already exceed 50% of the total utilized agricultural 
area (UAA) in France, Belgium, Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and 
they are increasing in most EU countries (Ciaian et al., 2012b). At the same time, soil 
degradation and erosion have increasingly become a concern. Globally, a third of all land is at 
least moderately degraded, with Europe having an especially long history of human-induced 
threats to soil fertility (FAO and ITPS, 2015). The costs of soil degradation for agricultural 
production are considerable, with estimates ranging from 212 to 620 million British pounds 
just for the UK (Graves et al., 2015). Agriculture is a key factor in this respect. Farmers 
experience the immediate impacts of soil degradation first-hand but also cause soil depletion 
and exhaustion through their land use. Therefore, governments and other actors increasingly 
aim to incentivise farmers to conserve soil (Louwagie et al., 2009; Panagos et al., 2016). 
In light of these considerations, it is of interest to investigate whether efforts to support soil 
conservation may be counteracted by the recent developments in European land markets. To 
do so, we need to understand whether the formal property context – in our case, ownership 
and rental – of a piece of land is one of the mechanisms that determine farmers’ soil 
conservation and the context in which this mechanism may be (in)active. We distinguish 
between land ownership and rental by referring to the analytical notion of property rights. 
Property defines a social relationship between actors with regard to a valuable property object, 
in our case land (Bromley, 1991; von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006). Ownership expresses 
the fullest bundle of property rights. Owners can transfer partial rights to renters, who can 
make use of the land for an agreed period of time but usually do not hold further rights such 
as the right to transfer or to change the land. The metaphor of the bundle of property rights, 
which has found cross-disciplinary recognition (Bromley, 1991; von Benda-Beckmann et al., 
2006), highlights that the involved parties are tied together in social as well as legal 
relationships. It is important to distinguish the formal rights (‘categorical property 
relationships’) from actual social relationships (‘concretised social relationships’), as the de-
jure property rights status may be quite different from actual property practices (von Benda-
Beckmann et al., 2006). This makes it necessary for us to consider not only the legal 
relationship but also the wider social context between renter and landowner when analysing 
the potential effect of property rights. In addition, not only the mere type of property rights to a 
piece of land but also the nuanced formal and informal arrangements thereof matter for 
farmers’ behaviour. Both are usually not covered in the existing literature. We address all these 
aspects in this study. 
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The aims of this study are (1) to test the hypothesis that farmers practise less soil conservation 
on rented land than on owned land and (2) to investigate the circumstances of rental that may 
cause or counteract this purported relationship. To address both aims, we first use regression 
analysis of an extensive secondary dataset at the plot level from the Austrian Integrated 
Accounting and Control System (IACS). We test whether there is an observed difference in 
crop choice between rented and owned land at the empirical level. To gain a deeper insight 
into the relationship between rental and soil conservation we then qualitatively analyse 
transcripts of semi-structured interviews with Austrian crop farmers. This gives us a deeper 
insight into when and why farmers make (no) differences in soil conservation between rented 
and owned plots. The present study will thus add to the existing literature by expanding its 
geographical focus to the European situation, by providing well-founded evidence due to the 
exceptionally large and detailed dataset we use in the quantitative part, and by offering 
additional context through its combined use of quantitative and qualitative methods. 
Soil conservation covers many aspects of farming, including crop residue management, soil 
amendments such as fertilisation and application of manure, contour farming and strip 
cropping, and the choice of cropping system (Beste, 2005; Blanco-Canqui and Lal, 2010). We 
consider both prevention of degradation (e.g., erosion), as well as active enhancement of soil 
as conservation. In the quantitative part of the study we use crop choice as an indicator for a 
practice that is within a farmer’s control and that is available in our dataset. In the qualitative 
part we take a broader approach and do not predefine soil conservation, but use farmers’ own 
understanding of the concept. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We first introduce our study area, Austria. 
We then describe the quantitative and qualitative data, indicators, and methods used in 
chapter three. The fourth chapter presents the results from both study parts. Finally, the 
discussion brings both results together and puts them into the wider context. 
2 Study area: Austria 
Austria is a good example of a country that follows the general European trend of rental and 
structural change. Both the sales market and the rental market for agricultural land in Austria 
are regulated relatively tightly (Swinnen et al., 2016) at the level of the nine ‘Bundesländer’ 
(provinces). The respective ‘Grundverkehrsgesetze’ (property transaction laws) of each 
province regulate agricultural land sale transactions. While differences between provinces 
exist, these laws generally favour the transfer of land to neighbouring and active farmers over 
non-agricultural investors. Reference durations for different farming types provide a guideline 
for rental contract lengths, and, despite not being as strong as legal minimum durations, 
ensure some protection of renters (Holzer et al., 2013). Rental prices are, similarly, not 
explicitly regulated, but the law includes the concept of an ‘adequate rent’. 
While the number of farms is steadily decreasing, the utilized agricultural area (UAA) per farm 
increased from 12.6 ha in 1990 to 19.7 ha in 2016 (BMLFUW, 2017). This increase in farm 
area has largely happened via the rental of land that has been given up by other farmers 
(Holzer et al., 2013). According to IACS data, the share of rented land increased from 22.6% 
of UAA in 2001 to 39.2% in 2012, and the share of farms renting at least some part of their 
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land has increased from 41.9% to 69.6% of farms (BMLFUW, 2013, 2002). Due to differing 
inheritance laws and traditions, there are substantial regional differences in rental shares 
between provinces, ranging from 24.6% in Salzburg (in the mid-west of Austria) to 63.6% in 
Burgenland (in the east). Moreover, cropland (43.8%) was rented more often than grassland 
(32.7%) in 2013 (BMLFUW, 2013). As a consequence, farmers’ expenditures for rent as a 
share of total expenditures have increased continuously over the last few years (BMLFUW, 
2016). In Austria, rental of farmland is predominantly cash rent, while sharecropping is virtually 
inexistent. 
3 Data and Methods 
3.1 Quantitative data and indicators 
Aside from having an immediate effect on the economic outcome of farming, individual crops 
also differ in their capacity to enhance or exhaust soils in the long run, and to foster erosion 
due to differing row spacing and canopy cover (see also Universal Soil Loss Equation, 
Wischmeier and Smith, 1978). We therefore use farmers’ choice of crops as a proxy for their 
soil conservation efforts. We classify crops into three groups: wide-row crops, corn, and 
legumes. Wide-row crops tend to increase soil loss through run-off, particularly on sloping 
plots, as a large part of the soil remains uncovered for a prolonged period. Farmers can 
mitigate this effect by taking specific measures such as using mulch-till/no-till technology. 
Nevertheless, following Sklenicka et al. (2015), we propose that on average and compared to 
other crops, wide-row crops are more prone to erosion than other crops and thus we use them 
as an indicator for soil non-conservation.1 Wide-row crops are comprised of corn, beets, 
potatoes, and sunflowers. Austrian farmers frequently grow potatoes and beets under 
contract, limiting their crop choice decisions to some extent. We therefore use corn alone as 
a second indicator for an intensive and erosion-prone crop choice. Conversely, legumes are 
considered soil enhancing, as they increase the available nitrogen in the soil. We use them as 
an indicator for a soil-conserving crop choice. Legumes include: clover, grass-clover ley, 
alfalfa, lupin, peas, peavine, beans (soy beans, field beans), lentils, chickpeas, and vetch. 
The Austrian IACS dataset contains plot-level information on the main crops planted on each 
plot for all farms receiving direct payments under the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, 
i.e., 86% of Austrian farms (Hofer and Gmeiner, 2012). Due to the minimum eligibility criteria 
for most AES, the dataset does not cover most farms that farm less than 2 ha UAA. 
Nevertheless, for cropland the coverage amounts to 99.3% when comparing the IACS dataset 
with the farm structure survey (FSS) (Hofer and Gmeiner, 2012), such that any potential bias 
from this lack of data should be negligible. The farms in our final dataset farm between 0.1 ha 
and 2800 ha with crops (mean: 22 ha, median: 12 ha) on up to 1089 plots (mean: 15 plots, 
median: 10 plots). 
The dataset has three levels: plots, fields, and legal property items. Plots are the actual 
management units, planted with a single crop in one year (descriptive statistics for plots see 
below). Fields are a larger entity and may contain several plots, and thus several different 
crops. The average field in our dataset contains 1.18 plots, and field sizes range from 0.1 ha 
                                               
1 We also test only those farms not using mulch-till/no-till technology, see below. 
Heidi Leonhardt; Klaus Salhofer; Marianne Penker 
Do Farmers Care About Rented Land? A Multi-Method Study on Land Tenure and Soil Conservation 
FORLand-Working Paper 06 (2018)   - 8 - 
to 165 ha (median: 0.97 ha, mean: 1.7 ha). The property status of a piece of farmland is not 
assigned to the single farmed plot, but to underlying legal property items. These legal property 
items are not always congruent with plots or fields. Due to this mismatch and the structure of 
the data, property status can be extrapolated for only two thirds of plots and is unclear for the 
rest; we assign the property status ‘unknown’ to the latter. In addition, farmers occasionally 
swap plots, or farm plots without formally renting them (e.g., plots belonging to neighbours, 
family, etc.). We assign these plots (property status ‘right to use’ in the original dataset) to the 
same category, ‘unknown’. All other plots are either ‘rented’ or ‘owned’. 
In addition, the dataset includes the following information at the plot level (either directly at 
that level, or extrapolated from the field level): plot size, slope angle, a crop yield indicator 
reflecting soil quality, altitude, information on plot-level AES participation (some of which can 
be used as indicators for ecologically sensitive areas), and geo-spatial location (coordinates). 
All plots are linked to the farm that farms them. Using geo-spatial information on the location 
of the farmhouse, we calculate a linear distance between a plot and the farmhouse to reflect 
accessibility of a plot.2 The dataset additionally contains some information at the farm level: 
organic/conventional farming, participation in soil-enhancing AES, farm standard output, and 
farm type.3 We use this information to split the sample and investigate the farm type-specific 
effects of rental. 
Based on climate, altitude, soil and topology, Austria is divided into eight main agricultural 
production areas (Statistik Austria, 2018). We select three production areas with a strong 
presence of crop production for this study (see Figure 1): Alpenvorland (alpine foothills), 
Nordöstliches Flach- und Hügelland (north-eastern lowland and hills), and Südöstliches Flach- 
und Hügelland (south-eastern lowland and hills). We use all available data from these regions. 
Assuming that the cropland coverage of the IACS is approximately 99% for all regions alike, 
our dataset covers the vast majority of cropland in our study area. 
                                               
2  This introduces some error due to data and measurement errors, justifying a removal of outliers. 
We remove all plots from the sample that are outside 2 times the interquartile range of the lower 
and upper quartiles of the distance in logs, corresponding to plots closer than 17.4 meters to, or 
more than 63 kilometres away from the farmhouse. This excludes 688 plots farmed by 289 different 
farms. 
3  Standard output is a standardised measure of farm revenues from different activities. It is used to 
classify farms by economic size and farming type (European Commission, 2014). 
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Figure 1: Main Agricultural Production Areas of Austria 
 
We use data for the year 2012, the most recent year where all necessary information is 
available. The final sample includes 43,102 farms farming 670,760 plots with field crops. Out 
of these, 18.894 farms with 326.219 plots farm at least one (known) rented and one owned 
plot. Table 1 provides summary statistics of all plots by property status. We see that compared 
to owned plots, rented plots are slightly more frequently planted with wide-row crops, and 
slightly less frequently planted with legumes. Rented plots are smaller, flatter, of better soil 
quality, and at a lower altitude than owned plots, but all of these differences are small. Rented 
plots are also somewhat more frequently located in ecologically sensitive areas (areas 
designated as ecologically valuable with specific management requirements, compensated 
via AES) than owned plots. A large difference between rented and owned plots exists in their 
distance to the farmhouse. Rented plots are on average 1.3 kilometres further away from the 
farmhouse than owned plots. Plots with an ‘unknown’ status show similarly minor differences 
to those with a known property status. We therefore retain these plots in our quantitative 
analysis to control for potential structural differences. To test the statistical significance of the 
differences in means between plots of different property status, we regress all variables on 
property status in turn. This allows us to account for the clustered structure of the data beyond 
a simple ANOVA by introducing cluster-robust standard errors at the farm level. With two 
exceptions4, differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
                                               
4  The percentage of corn does not differ significantly between rented and owned plots. The 
percentage of plots under AES does not differ significantly between rented and unknown plots, and 
differs significantly only at the 10% level between owned and unknown plots. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of plot-level IACS data by property status 
 
3.2 Quantitative model and estimation strategy 
Some problems may arise when analysing the treatment effect of property status for crop 
choice. First, endogeneity problems due to a correlation of farm characteristics with property 
status as well as crop choice can bias the results. Our data set includes little information at 
the level of the farm, such as socio-economic factors including farmer’s education, gender and 
age, and farm structural factors such as share of family labour, mechanisation, etc. Similarly, 
information at the district or regional level such as the presence of biogas facilities, climatic 
conditions, or regional traditions are missing. To control for such farm characteristics, we 
introduce cluster-specific fixed effects at the level of the farm. This allows us to estimate the 
treatment effect of property status in an unbiased way, as characteristics at the farm level (or 
higher, e.g., the regional level) that influence crop choice are now contained in and controlled 
for by the fixed effects. It is important to note that as a consequence only farms with both 
rented and owned plots will effectively contribute to the results concerning property status, 
reducing the number of farms and plots contributing to these results to 18.894 and 326.219, 
respectively5. Second, land quality differences between rented and owned plots may cause 
different crop choices and at the same time be related to differences in property status. We 
introduce all control variables available in the IACS dataset covering soil quality, slope, plot 
size, etc. at the plot level to account for such a potential bias. However, we cannot account for 
land quality differences that are e.g., caused by previous farming and management. This factor 
may correlate with property status, especially for newly rented plots (as previous farmers may 
                                               
5  We nevertheless retain also full-owners and full-renters in our analysis in order to get correct 
estimates of the influence of our control variables on crop choice. 
 
Owned Rented Unknown Total 
Number of plots 213,465 249,620 207,675 670,760 
% of plots with wide-row crops 28.92 29.64 30.73 29.75 
% of plots with corn 23.07 23.51 24.99 23.83 
% of plots with legumes 9.17 8.68 8.17 8.68 
Mean plot size (ha) 
(min-max) 
1.49 
(0.01-117.76) 
1.26 
(0.01-77.84) 
1.6 
(0.01-73.33) 
1.44 
(0.01-117.76) 
Mean slope (%) 
(min-max) 
6.48 
(0.01-50.64) 
5.58 
(0.01-93.18) 
5.99 
(0-85.54) 
5.99 
(0-93.18) 
Mean soil quality index (1-100) 
(min-max) 
49.54 
(0.1-100) 
50.02 
(0.2-99.7) 
49.28 
(0.1-99.9) 
49.64 
(0.1-100) 
Mean altitude (m) 
(min-max) 
312 
(113-927) 
272 
(113-891) 
288 
(113-849) 
290 
(113-927) 
% protected by AES 2.81 3.15 2.99 2.99 
Mean distance to farmhouse (m) 
(min-max) 
1,505 
(17-62,714) 
2,843 
(18-63,353) 
1,999 
(18-62,911) 
2,156 
(17-63,353) 
Number of farms 
   
43,102 
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have overused or otherwise degraded the land before losing the plot or quitting farming). This 
may bias our results. For example, such a (newly) rented plot then requires special care and 
the farmer will be more likely to plant e.g., legumes rather than corn during the first years, i.e., 
acting opposite to what we would initially expect. We however believe that this potential bias 
is small, as we have the impression that land transfers (via sale or rental) are relatively rare 
(see discussion section). Third, statistical problems may arise from sampling issues, such as 
farms being clustered. Given that our dataset covers >99% of cropland and we include the 
entire dataset in our analysis we can avoid this problem. 
To estimate the relationship between rental and crop choice, we thus use the following model: 
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷′𝐃𝐃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜸𝜸′𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 [1] 
where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the respective indicator (e.g., presence of a wide-row crop) on plot j belonging 
to farm i and 𝐃𝐃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a set of dummies indicating whether the plot is owned (default), rented, or 
the property status is unknown. 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 are cluster-specific fixed effects, 𝜷𝜷′ and 𝜸𝜸′ are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
We begin with a very simple model with no control variables 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and no cluster specific fixed 
effects 𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 (model (1)). In the second step (model (2)), we extend the model by the following 
control variables 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : size of the plot (hectares in logs), its slope angle (%), a soil-quality 
indicator (crop yield indicator, scale from 0 – 100), altitude (meters above sea), whether the 
plot is located in an ecologically sensitive area (dummy variables), and the linear distance 
between farmhouse and plot (metres in logs). For both models (1) and (2) we calculate cluster-
robust standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), as the observations are likely to be 
clustered by farm. 
To account for farm-level heterogeneity, we introduce the cluster-specific fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖, first 
without (3), then with control variables 𝐗𝐗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4). These fixed effects (corresponding to farm-
specific intercepts) are not explicitly calculated. Instead, they are eliminated using the within 
transformation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge, 2010).  
The dependent variables 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are all binary and describe the presence (𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) or absence 
(𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0) of a specific crop on a plot. For such binary dependent variables, probit or logit 
models are usually preferred. However, in a fixed effects setting, these models suffer from the 
so-called ‘incidental parameters problem’ (Greene, 2004; Lancaster, 2000). Random effects 
probit or logit models are not affected by this problem, but assume the unobserved farm effects 
to be random and uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables. We therefore estimate a 
linear probability model (LPM). The estimated parameters of the model can then be interpreted 
as changes in the probability of the presence of a specific crop, i.e., wide-row crop, corn or 
legumes. 
As the farm fixed effects eliminate all plot-invariant farm level characteristics, we cannot 
estimate whether different types of farms exhibit different effects of rental. To investigate this, 
we can, however, split the full sample according to various farm characteristics. We consider 
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the following characteristics: (i) farms with a small, medium, or large standard output (cut-off 
points at 30,000 and 100,000 € standard output), (ii) different types of farms (predominantly 
animal husbandry, field crops, fodder crops, mixed farming), (iii) organic/conventional farms, 
(iv) farms participating in any of the following soil conserving AES (or not): direct seeding or 
and seeding on mulch (mulch-till/no-till), environmentally sound management of arable and 
grassland surfaces (‘UBAG’), and greening of arable land. 
3.3 Qualitative data and method of analysis 
For the qualitative part of our study, we analyse the transcripts of 26 semi-structured interviews 
conducted with Austrian farmers in December 2017 and January 2018. All interviewees farm 
some amount of cropland, farm rented and owned plots and are situated in one of the three 
chosen agricultural production areas depicted in Figure 1. Considering only farmers with both 
rented and owned land limits our results, as full owners or full tenants (very rare) may have a 
different attitude and report different practices than mixed tenure farmers. However, it also 
ensures compatibility with the quantitative analysis, where only farms with both types of plots 
contribute to the results. 
Beyond these main criteria, participants were selected to cover a wide range of different farm 
types and farmers. We recruited interviewees via several channels, depending on the 
province: farm advisors of the Austrian Chamber of Agriculture provided direct farm contacts 
(Styria) or lists with contact information (Burgenland), an open call for participants in a 
newsletter of the Chamber of Agriculture of the province of Lower Austria, a call for participants 
among students of [name withheld for anonymity during peer review] (yielding contacts in 
Burgenland, Lower Austria and Upper Austria, mostly students’ parents or relatives), and 
contacts via environmental NGOs and extension services (mainly Upper Austria). In two 
cases, interviewees established contact with further farmers from their neighbourhood. In total, 
we approached 32 interviewees (none declined the interview, however 6 interviews could not 
be used due to no rented land, not in the required agricultural production area). We interviewed 
the main decision maker of each farm, which in four cases were two people (husband and 
wife or father and son). Aside from the interviewed couples, only one of the 26 analysed 
interviews was with a female farmer. Six farms were run as part-time farms (self-described) at 
the time of the interview, eleven had some kind of livestock, and six were organic farms. The 
interviewees were farming between 11 and 800 hectares of cropland and were renting 
between approximately 10% and over 90% of their cropland. The interviewees held different 
rental contracts, many permanent with a 6- or 12-month notice period, others had contracts 
limited to three, five or ten years.  
Table A in the appendix provides more detailed information about the interviewees. 
Each interview lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. The interview guideline covered several 
topics: general information about the farm, rental conditions (including differences between 
rented and owned plots), soil conservation measures, and farmers’ connection with soil. We 
did not define a priori what ‘soil conservation’ comprises, but let the interviewees decide what 
to include. For the present paper, we analyse only those parts of the interview transcripts that 
concern land rental and ownership. Transcripts were coded using qualitative content analysis 
with inductive category formation (Mayring, 2015). The category definitions for coding are 
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defined as follows: (1) differences in land use between rented and owned plots explicitly 
mentioned by the farmers (referring to themselves or others); (2) circumstances of rental that 
farmers state as reasons for (not) treating rented plots differently than owned plots. 
Coding and initial analysis were done using the software atlas.ti (Muhr, 2014). We coded 
relevant text parts and grouped emerging codes into code families named ‘differences’, ‘yes’ 
and ‘no’ for category (1), such that co-occurrences could be explored. For category (2), we 
analysed co-occurrences of the same families with the code families ‘rationale for differences’ 
and ‘rationale for no differences’. Codes were then synthesised to produce a small number of 
central topics raised by the interviewees. To a limited extent, we accounted for the context of 
the farmers (e.g., organic/conventional farming) for analysis, but no effort was made to do, 
e.g., systematic axial coding. 
4 Results 
4.1 Quantitative results 
Table 2 depicts the results of the linear probability model (LPM) for wide-row crops. We find 
that there is a statistically significant correlation between the planting of wide-row crops and 
land rental in a simple LPM without and with control variables (models (1) and (2)): The 
probability that a wide-row crop is planted on a rented plot is 2.3 percentage points higher 
than on an owned plot when controlling for plot-specific variables. However, this effect 
becomes insignificant once farm fixed effects are introduced (models (3) and (4)). On average, 
an individual farmer is thus equally likely to plant wide-row crops on an owned plot and a 
rented plot when farm and plot characteristics are accounted for. 
Table 2: Regression results for wide-row crops 
 Dependent variable: wide-row crops 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Farm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Unknown ownership 0.018*** (0.002) 0.021*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) -0.004** (0.002) 
Rented 0.007*** (0.003) 0.023*** (0.003) -0.007*** (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
log(size)  0.039*** (0.001)  0.052*** (0.001) 
Slope angle  -0.001*** (0.0002)  -0.005*** (0.0002) 
Soil quality indicator  0.002*** (0.0001)  0.002*** (0.0001) 
Altitude  0.0002*** (0.00001)  -0.0004*** (0.00004) 
Ecologically sensitive area  -0.218*** (0.005)  -0.125*** (0.005) 
log(distance)  -0.009*** (0.001)  -0.002* (0.001) 
Constant 0.289*** (0.002) 0.246*** (0.012)   
Observations 670,760 670,760 670,760 670,760 
Households - - 43,102 43,102 
R2 (full model) 0.0003 0.025 0.264 0.289 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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For corn alone (see Table 3), the results are similar to wide-row crops. In an LPM with no farm-
fixed effects, the probability that corn is planted on a rented plot is 3.2 percentage points higher 
than on an owned plot. Once farm-fixed effects are introduced, a statistically significant 
difference between rental and ownership remains, but its effect (0.7 percentage points 
difference in probability) is relatively small. 
Table 3: Regression results for corn 
 
Dependent variable: corn  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Farm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Unknown ownership 0.019*** (0.002) 0.030*** (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) 
Rented 0.004 (0.003) 0.032*** (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 
log(size) 
 
0.028*** (0.001) 
 
0.041*** (0.001) 
Slope angle 
 
-0.001*** (0.0002) 
 
-0.003*** (0.0002) 
Soil quality indicator 
 
0.0001 (0.0001) 
 
0.001*** (0.0001) 
Altitude 
 
0.0004*** (0.00001) 
 
-0.0004*** (0.00003) 
Ecologically sensitive area 
 
-0.168*** (0.005) 
 
-0.077*** (0.004) 
log(distance) 
 
-0.010*** (0.001) 
 
0.001 (0.001) 
Constant 0.231*** (0.002) 0.173*** (0.012) 
  
Observations 670,760 670,760 670,760 670,760 
Households - - 43,102 43,102 
R2 (full model) 0.0004 0.024 0.331 0.347 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 4: Regression results for legumes 
 
Dependent variable: legumes  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Farm fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Unknown ownership -0.010*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.0003 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Rented -0.005*** (0.002) 0.004*** (0.002) 0.002* (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
log(size) 
 
0.005*** (0.0004) 
 
0.006*** (0.0004) 
Slope angle 
 
-0.0003** (0.0001) 
 
0.001*** (0.0001) 
Soil quality indicator 
 
-0.001*** (0.0001) 
 
-0.0001** (0.00005) 
Altitude 
 
0.0001*** (0.00001) 
 
0.0001*** (0.00002) 
Ecologically sensitive area 
 
-0.050*** (0.003) 
 
-0.043*** (0.004) 
log(distance) 
 
-0.003*** (0.001) 
 
-0.002*** (0.001) 
Constant 0.092*** (0.001) 0.113*** (0.008) 
  
Observations 670,760 670,760 670,760 670,760 
Households - - 43,102 43,102 
R2 (full model) 0.0002 0.006 0.233 0.234 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Similarly, the planting of legumes appears to be almost unrelated to the property status of a 
plot (see Table 4). Already the simple LPM shows only a very small effect of rental for the 
probability of legumes being planted on a plot, which is, contrary to expectations, positive 
(+0.5 percentage points difference in probability). This remains the same once farm fixed 
effects are introduced: It is on average 0.4 percentage points more likely for legumes to be 
planted on a rented plot compared to an owned plot for the same farmer. 
In terms of model specification, the R²s of models (1) and (2) show that not considering farm-
level characteristics altogether provides a very poor fit of the data. Similarly, comparing models 
(1) and (3) as well as (2) and (4) with F-tests reveals the farm fixed effects to be significant at 
least at the 1% level, with F (43,101, 627,650) = 5.4195 for wide-row crops with no control 
variables and F (43,101, 627,660) = 5.2069 with control variables included.6 
The coefficients of the control variables largely show expected signs: The larger a plot, the 
more likely a farmer will plant wide-row crops or corn. Legumes are also found more frequently 
on larger plots, but the effect here is much smaller. Better soil quality is positively correlated 
with the planting of wide-row crops and corn, but negatively (albeit with a very small effect) 
correlated with legumes. Steeper plots and plots at a higher altitude are less likely to be farmed 
with wide-row crops and corn, but more likely to be farmed with legumes. There is only a small 
negative and barely significant effect of the distance between a plot and the farmhouse on the 
planting of wide-row crops and an insignificant effect for corn. For legumes, the effect is slightly 
positive and statistically significant. The results for the indicator variable for ‘ecologically 
sensitive area’ are also as expected: being located in such a designated area greatly reduces 
the probability of wide-row crops (including corn) being planted on a plot but also reduces the 
probability of legumes. This confirms that farmers comply with the individually designed 
management plans for these plots, which may require leaving the land fallow or using it for 
fodder crops only. 
Looking at different subgroups of farms for differences in the planting of crops, we do not find 
statistically and economically significant (defined here as a difference greater than one 
percentage point between rented and owned plots) effects of rental for most subsamples. 
Table 5 shows coefficients and standard errors for the variable ‘rented’ for the model 
specification (4), i.e., including fixed effects and control variables. We find most significant 
effects at the level of farm types: livestock farmers are more likely to plant wide-row crops on 
rented plots than on owned plots (+1.6 percentage points difference, opposite sign than other 
farm types), and the relationship holds for corn (+1.7 difference). Mixed farms show a similar 
effect for corn (+1 difference), while fodder-crop farms are more likely to plant legumes on 
rented plots than on owned plots (+1.1 difference). Large farms show a tendency to plant more 
wide-row crops and in particular corn on rented plots (+0.9 difference for wide-row crops, +1.2 
difference for corn). Conversely, organic farmers are less likely to plant wide-row crops on 
rented plots as opposed to owned plots (-1.3 difference, opposite sign than conventional 
farms), and farms that do not participate in the greening AES appear to be more likely to plant 
corn on rented plots than on owned plots (+1.2). All other subsamples do not exhibit a 
significant effect of rental, comparable to the full sample. 
                                               
6 Results for corn and legumes are very similar and available upon request. 
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Table 5: Effects of rental on crop choice (model specification (4)) for different 
subsamples 
  
Coefficient 
(SE) 
wide-row 
Coefficient 
(SE)  
corn 
Coefficient 
(SE) 
legumes 
No. of 
farms 
No. of  
plots 
Farm standard output 
(€) 
Small -0.006 (0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 19,532 153,652 
Medium -0.001 (0.003) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 13,897 268,091 
Large 0.009
*** 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 9,325 246,106 
Farm type 
Animal husbandry 0.016
*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 5,709 98,679 
Field crops -0.0002 (0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 16,307 303,790 
Fodder crops -0.004 (0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 9,484 95,960 
Mixed farming -0.002 (0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 6,083 117,386 
Participation in  
no-till/ mulch-till AES 
Yes 0.00002 (0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 12,711 329,352 
No 0.005
* 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 30,391 341,408 
Organic farms  
(AES participation) 
Organic -0.012
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.007) 3,556 70,201 
Conventional 0.004
* 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 39,546 600,559 
Participation in  
UBAG AES 
Yes 0.0004 (0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 18,977 405,006 
No 0.005 (0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.002) 24,125 265,754 
Participation in greening 
AES 
Yes 0.001 (0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 26,217 541,932 
No 0.009
* 
(0.005) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.003) 16,885 128,828 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors (SE) are cluster-robust. 
 
4.2 Qualitative results 
The results from the qualitative part of the study concerning whether or not property status 
has an impact on soil conservation are mixed. While some interviewees state that they do 
differentiate between rented and owned plots, or would do so under certain circumstances, 
others maintain that they treat all their plots equally, irrespective of property status. Some 
assert that it is ‘common’, e.g., among their neighbours, to take less care about soil on rented 
plots compared to owned plots, or provide anecdotal evidence of such behaviour. Others, 
however, claim that they have not experienced this. 
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When interviewed farmers do mention differences in soil conservation (for themselves or 
others) between rented and owned plots, it is (in declining order of importance) with respect 
to the following: fertilization, liming, crop choice, soil compaction, and soil exploitation or soil 
quality improvement in a general sense. However, for all of these practices we also find 
opposing statements. Examples that interviewees mention explicitly where they make no 
difference include: fertilization, liming, crop rotation, soil improvement through cover crops, 
erosion prevention measures (cover crops, reducing slope length), soil testing, and general 
soil exploitation or improvement. 
When talking about differences in soil conservation practices, interviewees provide three 
arguments that justify why they do (or would) apply different soil conservation measures. First, 
the imminent end of rental is a (hypothetical) reason for not implementing measures with a 
long-term effect, such as specific types of fertilization (phosphorus-potassium (PK) fertilizer, 
heavy organic fertilizer) or liming: “There would only be a difference if I knew that the rental 
contract is ending and … I cannot expect that I may or can continue renting that [plot], in that 
case I maybe would … cut down on fertilisation, at least with phosphorus and potash … so 
that I sort of … that I don’t increase nutrients, but rather live on the substance that’s there.” 
(P16 052). Crop choice or crop residue removal from a plot may also be adapted in the last 
year of a contract, to make good use of a plot: “He lost 20 hectares and then he did everywhere 
… he had never, I believe, baled the straw, but when he heard this he suddenly baled 
everything. That he squeezes the last out of it.“ (P17 213) 
Second, insecure rental is a reason for interviewees not to undertake investments in soil 
conservation. This is especially important when the costs of investment are high (e.g., soil 
quality of a rented plot is initially very low): “What I am not so careful about on the rented plots 
that’s the liming, right. … Because that is simply too much money for me at once that I am 
investing. And because, well, in my opinion, the landowner should also contribute a little bit.” 
(P4 110) 
Third, the distance between a plot and the farmhouse may determine management decisions, 
and this distance is itself related to the property status. In particular, two interviewees mention 
that their rented plots are further away from the farmhouse than their owned plots, and thus 
the application of manure or crop rotations differ. Transporting manure across large distances 
is costly and time-consuming, as is travelling to distant plots for any farming operation, such 
that low-maintenance crops or fallow may be chosen for this land. 
The reasons that interviewees provide for not having any differences in soil conservation 
practices can again be grouped into three categories: the social (property) relationship, rental 
security, and the general attitude of the farmer. In many cases, the relationship between 
landowner and renter appears to be close and personal (family, neighbours). To some extent, 
this ensures long-term rental by default (e.g., when a farmer rents land from their spouse) but 
also leads to a sense of responsibility towards the landowner. On the other hand, a landowner 
can also exert social control over a renter. Knowing the leaseholder personally and observing 
their conduct, landowners may impose informal requirements for (continued) rental, such as 
adhering to crop rotation or avoiding soil compaction: “Actually, I have one landowner… It was 
like this: I got this plot three years ago, because he [the landowner] was not satisfied with the 
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previous renter anymore, because for 15 years he had grown only corn. And he did tell me 
that it doesn’t work like this. That if I want the plot, I have to work differently.” (P4 60) Ignoring 
these requirements may lead to the loss of rented plots in the long run, even if such conditions 
are not formally included in rental contracts (such contractual management requirements have 
been reported as being very rare). However, personal connections and resulting mutual trust 
appears to be under threat as landowners cease to live in the countryside and lose their 
connection to farming. One farmer illustrates this development and its consequences nicely: 
“This one plot … that we lost, that was an indirect generational change. The old owner 
unfortunately died and his nieces inherited it. … And they live in [town near Austria’s capital] 
and God knows where. And they wanted to see money. … When there is a generational 
change, then the connection to land and property itself isn’t there anymore. … Then it all 
comes down to money. And this will, I believe, increase.” (P19 414-423). 
Beyond the individual social ties between landowner and renter, social norms and 
expectations about what it means to be a good farmer (including conserving soil) by 
neighbours and villagers also play a role. Farmers expect others to gossip about them if they 
farm their (rented) soils badly, and talk disparagingly about other farmers who treat rented land 
inadequately and who thus “don’t think much” (P15 364). 
In addition, many interviewed farmers consider their rental secure, despite holding contracts 
that are terminable at short notice (6 months/one growing season), and this security induces 
them to conserve soil for their own future farming. The perceived security of rental may be due 
to the personal ties just mentioned, but it may also be due to fragmented and interlaced plot 
structures that make access to individual plots difficult for other farmers, or because it is simply 
not common to terminate contracts. We find that some interviewees actively try to enhance 
their rental security by strengthening their relationship with the landowners or by ‘signalling’ to 
them that they are taking good care of their plots. For example, one interviewee pays his rent 
in person and brings Christmas presents to his landowners to “keep the people with me” (p17 
430). Others make sure that their plots look neat and tidy to signal diligence to landowners. 
Lastly, some farmers appear to not differentiate between rented and owned plots in terms of 
soil conservation as a matter of principle; this is either because of their generally positive 
attitude towards soil (protection) or their attitude towards property: Farmer: “I don’t have this 
feeling towards the farm or the plot, when I’m out there, to say ‘There, this is mine now’. … I 
never had that. … I am farming it, and I am looking after it so that it is being preserved. But to 
say ‘Ah, now I am on my field’, I don’t have that.” Son: “Yes, and this is why the difference 
rented plot – owned plot, this is never there, somehow.” (P19 645-650). 
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate whether the property status of a piece of land is one of the 
mechanisms that determine farmers’ soil conservation behaviour and under which 
circumstances this mechanism is in effect. More precisely, we first test the hypothesis that 
farmers treat rented land differently than owned land by statistically analysing this relationship 
using crop choice as an indicator. Subsequently we illustrate and broaden the results by 
means of a qualitative analysis of interviews with farmers. 
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Our econometric analysis is based on practically all plots of the main crop production areas in 
Austria. Results show an initial correlation between rental and the planting of erosion-prone 
wide-row crops. However, this relationship virtually disappears once farm heterogeneity is 
accounted for by introducing farm fixed effects, such that we do not find a sizeable treatment 
effect for rental. This means that there must be some characteristics at the level of the farm 
(or the region), which correlate with rental and simultaneously with the planting of wide-row 
crops. However, given the limited information in our data set, we cannot identify these 
characteristics. Instead, an analysis of different subsamples reveals that for some farm types, 
a (small) treatment effect of property status for crop choice does exist. This is most notably for 
livestock farms, which tend to plant more wide-row crops and corn on their rented plots than 
on their owned plots, contrary to other types of farms. A similar tendency exists for larger 
farms, and the opposite is true for organic farms. All other types of farms show no significant 
effect of rental on crop choice. Organic farms operate on a different rental market than 
conventional farms, due to the required transition period when converting conventional land 
to organic land. It may thus be that organic farmers are more dependent on particular rented 
plots and want to increase their rental security by planting less wide-row crops on these plots 
in particular. On the other hand, hog farmers who operate in a very competitive environment, 
or large farmers in general may be more economically-minded than others and thus exhibit a 
‘rental effect’. Other than that it is unclear why some types of farms or farmers should make a 
difference in crop choice between rented and owned plots and others do not.  
However, the general findings of the quantitative analysis confirm some previous research. 
While evidence is generally mixed, especially studies that control for household fixed effects 
have shown to rarely produce significant results for rental in the context of countries of the 
Global South (Fenske, 2011). It is plausible that we find an even smaller effect in an 
institutional setting like Austria’s. Nevertheless, even where we do not control for farm 
heterogeneity, the correlation between rental and crop choice is much smaller than, for 
example, the correlation found by Sklenicka et al. (2015) in a similar study based on a smaller 
sample for the neighbouring Czech Republic. While in this particular case historical and 
institutional differences may be of overriding importance, our qualitative analysis provides rich 
results that may explain and illustrate this (lack of a) finding. 
First, given our quantitative data, we could only investigate farmers’ crop choice. However, the 
interviews show that differences in soil conservation may, if at all, rather occur in terms of 
fertilization or liming. Analysing the application of fertilizer or other long-term investments may 
thus lead to different results (Myyrä et al., 2007, 2005). However, our dataset does not include 
such information, and large plot-level datasets including these variables are generally difficult 
to find. Future research, e.g., based on data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network, which 
provides detailed farm-level (but not plot-level) information, is needed to investigate this 
question. 
Second, most theories of why farmers treat rented land differently than owned land rest on the 
assumption that rental is less secure than ownership and that limited rental periods shorten a 
farmer’s planning horizon. Our interviewees, however, are often confident that their rental is 
secure and they will farm their rented land for a long time in the future, at least as long as they 
adhere to good agricultural conduct. This may either be because rental contracts are generally 
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(and officially) long-term, or because even though contracts are short-term or terminable at 
short notice, farmers may perceive their rental to be secure and long-term. This links with what 
we pointed out in the beginning of this paper, that the nature of property in practice may be 
different from legal property rights (von Benda-Beckmann et al., 2006), and that there may be 
a difference between perceived tenure security and legal tenure security (van Gelder, 2010). 
Both situations will incentivise farmers to treat their rented plots like their own plots. Our 
findings concerning farmers’ behaviour at the end of rental confirm that long-term and secure 
rental may indeed be an important mechanism mitigating a potential negative effect of rental 
for soil conservation. If farmers know that they are going to lose a plot in the near future, some 
farmers will indeed change their soil conservation practices, such as avoiding investments 
and/or adjusting their crop choice in order to receive an adequate return in the last year of 
rental. Due to a lack of data on the details of rental contracts we cannot substantiate this 
relationship in our quantitative analysis, as such contracts are usually not registered with 
authorities in Austria. Moreover, to our knowledge, there is also no data on the average 
turnover of rented land in Austria. We can therefore not substantiate the impression that 
terminating or not renewing a rental contract is rather the exception than the rule, explaining 
why any possible ‘last year’ effect of rental does not appear in our quantitative analysis. Thus, 
investigating the official length of rental contracts may still not lead to satisfactory results, as 
contracts may be limited on paper, but prolonged on a regular basis in practice. 
Third, we find further factors that may counteract a potential negative effect of rental for soil 
conservation: social ties and farmers’ attitudes. Our interviews show that many landowners 
and renters have close personal contact, with landowners exerting social control. In particular, 
landowners that have farming knowledge and live in the area observe farming and soil 
conservation practices of renters. They may either pick their renters carefully, and/or punish 
misconduct with a termination of rental. Farmers know this and adjust their behaviour 
accordingly, preventing differences in soil conservation between owned and rented plots. This 
is in line with findings from Sweden (Grubbström and Eriksson, 2018), where landowners have 
been found to carefully choose who they sell or rent their land to, placing importance on good 
farming rather than purely economic considerations. In addition, we find that farmers generally 
want to live up to the expectations of their social surroundings about what it means to be a 
‘good’ farmer, which includes farming all fields equally well. Again, it would be interesting to 
substantiate this in a quantitative analysis, but we have no data on contracting parties (e.g., 
family membership, place of residence) available. 
In terms of farmers’ attitudes, we find that, for some farmers, treating all their land equally is a 
matter of principle. Their motivation is either a holistic interest in conserving soil (e.g., for the 
future of humankind), or a matter of experiencing the same feelings of (non-)ownership 
towards all plots, independent of property status. This finding may connect with the literature 
on farming styles (Schmitzberger et al., 2005; van der Ploeg, 1994) – for example, the 
convictions or self-identity of some types of farmers could make them ‘immune’ to a potential 
negative rental effect. It would certainly be interesting to investigate this with respect to 
established farming styles or farmer identities. However, as our analysis includes only farmers 
with both rented and owned plots, it is important to note that we might miss out on particular 
farming styles and conservation practices among, for example, full owners. 
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Last, we find that the distance between a plot and the farmhouse may influence farmers’ soil 
conservation efforts, confirming previous research (Grammatikopoulou et al., 2013). While not 
a direct effect of rental, this seems important given that rented plots are on average almost 
twice as far away as owned plots (see Table 1), and farms are becoming larger. Again, this 
appears to be most relevant with regard to fertilization, and thus it is not visible in our 
econometric model. Future research on this aspect should, however, take this finding into 
account. 
Seen from a more general perspective, our findings also show that it is not simply the binary 
distinction ‘rented’ and ‘owned’ that matters, but rather several continuous dimensions such 
as tenure security, contract length, or strength of social relationship between landowner and 
renter. This puts into question the crude distinction between rental and ownership made in 
many studies, including the present one. It may be a convenient approach driven by data 
availability, but any such approach will limit the insights into causal mechanisms that are to be 
gained. Our aim here was to contribute to already existing literature on the topic, which often 
uses the same classification. Our results have both shown the limits of this approach but at 
the same time have enabled us to name some of the circumstances and thus dimensions of 
the property relationship that should be considered in the future. 
In summary, our results show that formal and informal institutions matter for behaviour (cf. 
Vatn, 2015), i.e., they are mechanisms that do determine soil conservation, but they may have 
not only continuous, but also counteracting effects. Regarding formal institutions, it is not only 
the mere legal property status of a piece of land that is important but also its specificities such 
as the length and security of rental. We find that insecure rental and the near end of a rental 
contract may have particularly negative consequences for soil conservation. Informal 
institutions that appear important include personal relationships and social norms. This 
resonates with the definition of property given in the introduction to this text. Social 
relationships are an integral part of property relations. We find that in Austria, the shape of 
these social relationships supports rental security and soil conservation, and they thus 
counteract a potentially negative effect of rental. What is important in this context is that 
farmers and landowners can – and do – also actively influence the social circumstances of 
rental. For example, we find some ‘signalling’ behaviour of farmers towards their landowners 
with the aim of increasing rental security.7 Others actively nurture their personal relationship 
with landowners. Conversely, landowners who have an interest in soil conservation use 
informal requirements to incentivise their renters to comply with their wishes. 
We find some indications that problems may arise when the relationship between landowner 
and renter is less personal. This might become a more pressing issue in the future. The next 
generation of landowners may have less connection to the land they inherited and less farming 
knowledge than their parents (cf. our interviews). Informal requirements by landowners 
towards farmers will then decrease, and farmers will have fewer opportunities to prove that 
they ‘deserve’ a long-term rental due to their soil conservation behaviour. Social norms may 
still incentivise farmers to adhere to what is seen as good farming practices, but this may be 
                                               
7  This resonates with studies that show that tenure security is also a function of investments, not only 
the other way around. Farmers have been found to increase their tenure security by investing in the 
land (Brasselle et al., 2002; Moreda, 2018). 
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not enough to outweigh the loss in direct contact with landowners. Formal provisions in rental 
contracts concerning soil quality could be an option that appears to be already in use in rare 
cases. Legal regulations (such as minimum rental periods) or specifically-designed AES may 
be another option to avoid potential negative effects of increasing rental shares. However, 
further research on the developments of landowner-renter relationships is required to 
substantiate this impression and help design adequate incentive schemes. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Interviewee details 
No. Prod. area Interviewee(s) part-time  
(self-stated) 
Livestock, 
other 
organic Cropland 
(ha) 
% rented 
(approx.) 
usual rental contract 
length 
farm 
manager 
since 
P01 Alpenvorland farmer couple  Hogs, bulls 
 
21 38% permanent, 6 months 
notice 
2002 
P02 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer (sen.)  Hogs, horses x 75 47% permanent, 12 months 
notice 
2002 
P03 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
farmer couple x -  19 18% permanent, 12 months 
notice 
1990 
P04 Alpenvorland male farmer (jun.) x Vegetables  11 87% permanent, 6 months 
notice 
2018 
P05 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  -  320 63% 10 years, 12 months 
notice (if sold) 
1975 
P06 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  Hogs  34 59% 5 years and 
permanent 
1999 
P07 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  - x 190 63% 5 years 2013 
P08 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer (sen.)  Hogs 
 
25 48% 5 years and 
permanent 
1997 
P09 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer Until recently - x 18 0% 
(28%)8 
permanent 1995 
P10 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer (jun.) x - x 56 46% 5 years 2018 
P11 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  - 
 
270 (more 
abroad) 
80% permanent 1987 
P12 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  - x 60 50% permanent, 12 months 
notice 
1985 
                                               
8 Farmer had very recently lost his rented plots (7 ha). 
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No. Prod. area Interviewee(s) part-time  
(self-stated) 
Livestock, 
other 
organic Cropland 
(ha) 
% rented 
(approx.) 
usual rental contract 
length 
farm 
manager 
since 
P13 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  Dairy cows  39 46% 5 years 2014 
P14 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  Hogs  80 50% permanent 2006 
P15 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  -  800 (partly 
abroad) 
50% 5 years and 
permanent, 6 months 
notice 
2006 
P16 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  -  110 77% permanent 2015 
P17 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  -  190 92% Permanent and some 
limited, 6 months 
notice 
1995 
P18 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
female farmer x -  40 63% 
 
2014 
P19 Alpenvorland male farmer (sen. 
+ jun.), partly wife 
 -  175 66% permanent, 12 months 
notice 
1993 
P20 Alpenvorland male farmer  Hogs  55 31% 3 years 2016 
P21 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer  Hogs  95 63% permanent, 12 months 
notice 
1991 
P22 Nordöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer (sen.) x - x 38 32% 5 years 2010 
P23 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer x -  20 50% 5 years (AES period) 2015 
P24 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer   Hogs, 
Vegetables 
 77 10% permanent 2014 
P25 Alpenvorland male farmer, partly 
wife 
 Dairy cows  31 81% permanent, 6 months 
notice 
1999 
P26 Südöstl. Flach- 
und Hügelland 
male farmer, partly 
wife 
 Hogs  43 77% permanent, 6 months 
notice 
1998 
 
